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Decision-Making in the 
United States Court of Appeals 
New York Law School 
Faculty Luncheon 
November 19, 1986 
I am very pleased to have this opportunity to address the 
distinguished faculty of my alma mater. I know that it is a 
distinguished faculty, because it was so difficult to become a 
part of it. The screening process was more stringent than the 
one I went through to become a United States Circuit Judge. The 
faculty applied the strict scrutiny test to me. Recently, I 
underwent a retention election. The Professor who evaluated me 
said my teaching technique was okay but that I needed more 
practical experience. He also said that it would look better if 
I could have some writings published. 
This faculty, as well as the students and alumni, owe a lot 
to the Dean -- ulcers, headaches and similar ailments. The Dean 
is writing a book -- "How to Win Friends and Influence the Chief 
Justice of the United States." He recently said that the new 
Chief Justice would not be an effective leader of the court and, 
if he were effective, we should all be frightened. What 
frightens me is that people who graduated from Yale in the 60's 
now are law school deans. Jim Simon comes to us after a 
successful career in Uttar Pradesh, India. We are most fortunate 
to have as Dean a man who has become a legend in his own mind. 
Seriously, I do wish to congratulate the faculty. I think 
that this school is fortunate to have first-rate scholars but, 
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more importantly, first-rate teachers. You have trained some 
magnificent young lawyers, and I have reaped the benefit of your 
work. Last year, in my Circuit Chambers, I had Michael Roffer 
and Phil Essig, who were of great help to me during my first year 
on the Circuit Court. Michael now is with Skadden Arps and Phil 
is with Cahill Gordon. Both earn more than I do. This year, I 
am fortunate to have two especially brilliant people you have 
trained -- Charles Sullivan and Holly Januszkiewicz. As I travel 
around to participate in seminars, symposia and moot courts, I 
have had the opportunity to meet and speak with law professors 
from all over the country. These meetings and conversations 
convince me that the best law faculty in the nation is right here 
at New York Law School. All that you need is more visibility, 
and I shall do everything I can to help you in that regard. 
I have been asked what life really is like behind the 
scenes at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. I shall therefore 
take some time before my discussion of decision-making to give 
you some "brethren"-type information. My brothers and sister 
are, of course, a fascinating group. I could say that we all are 
kind, warm, friendly people~ I could say it, but it wouldn't be 
true. A district judge, I'll call him Judge "X," once compared 
us to soldiers who come onto the battlefield after the battle and 
shoot the wounded. He said that, because we once wrote an 
opinion reversing one of his decisions in the following words: 
"This is an appeal from a decision by Judge x, and we reverse for 
other reasons as well." 
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One of my colleagues dissented from one of my decisions in 
these words: "I dissent, substantially for the reasons given in 
the majority opinion." He later changed it to a concurrence: "I 
concur in so much of the majority opinion as is supported by the 
reasoning therein and dissent from the remainder." One of our 
judges told another that his clerks had done most of the work on 
a particular decision. The second judge then quoted a portion of 
the bible that he said pertained to law clerks: "Methusaleh 
leaned on his staff -- and died." 
My colleagues really shine during oral argument. A lawyer 
began his argument: "I represent a very unfortunate client." He 
started again: "I represent a most unfortunate client." The 
Presiding Judge said: "Keep going. We agree with you so far." 
A pro se litigant started her argument by saying: "God is my 
lawyer." I think it was Judge Kaufman who told her: "You should 
have someone locally." 
Sometimes, we talk to each other on the bench. During one 
oral argument by very distinguished counsel, a colleague leaned 
over and said: "When they made him, they threw away the shovel." 
Recently, a lawyer opened his argument with these words: "May it 
please the Court, my client sustained severe injuries when he 
fell from the loading dock at the post office. Because of these 
injuries, he is unable to have marital relations more than five 
times a week." A colleague whispered to me: "Where the hell is 
that loading platform?" The same judge described the talents of 
one overrated appellate advocate in these words: "He can take 
any dry case and make it dull and boring." 
I now turn to my discussion of decision-making in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. I paraphrase 
Bismarck when I say that judicial decision-making is like 
sausage: It's better not to know what goes into it. However, 
because some of you have expressed some interest in the subject, 
I shall undert~ke a brief discussion of the mechanical, as well 
as the intellectual ingredients of appellate decisions in my 
Court. Following that, I shall describe how a specific case, 
involving a claim of age discrimination in employment, gave rise 
to a rule of law in our circuit. If anybody is awake thereafter 
and time permits, I shall then take some questions. 
Between 1952 and 1982, while the nation's population 
increased by 50%, appeals to the circuit courts grew by 808%. 
In 1985, more than 33,000 appeals were filed in the circuit 
courts nationwide, about 6% more than in 1984 and almost 44% more 
than in 1980. In 1985, 2,837 cases were filed in my Court in 
1985, up from 2,153 in 1980. We issued 1,219 decisions last 
year, comprised of 508 signed opinions, 53 per curiam opinions 
and 658 summary orders. Decisions in the latter category are not 
published, are not uniformly available and cannot be cited 
because they are deemed to be with precedential value. There are 
168 circuit judges serving in the 13 federal circuits. 
Twenty-four of those judges hold seats first established by 
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Congress in 1984. There are 13 seats in the Second Circuit, two 
of which were established in 1984. 
I give you these statistics to demonstrate the caseload 
pressures and time constraints under which we labor. I offer 
this information to dispel the myth that circuit judges have 
sufficient time for study, reflection and writing. It is in fact 
almost impossible to give each case the consideration to which it 
is entitled, and the first reaction of new clerks is amazement at 
the speed with which we must do our work. 
Two to three weeks before each scheduled sitting, boxes and 
cartons arrive at Chambers in Albany from the Clerk's office at 
Foley Square. Contained in these packages are the briefs and 
appendices containing relevant parts of the record in the 
twenty-seven or twenty-eight cases to be heard by the 
three-member panel to which they are assigned. The cases will be 
sorted into files by the two secretaries and three clerks who 
comprise the Chambers staff. Before the sitting, I will have 
read each one of the briefs and skimmed each one of the 
appendices. In addition, the pro se law clerks employed by the 
Court will have provided a bench memorandum with recommendations 
as to each pro se appeal, and my clerks will have done the same 
as to all the other cases. 
As we work along toward the sitting week, I discuss with my 
clerks the cases they have been assigned. Although the 
responsibility for writing bench memos is divided, each clerk 
receives a copy of the memos written by the other clerks. In 
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this way, I can have input from each clerk on all the cases prior 
to argument. In addition, it is a tradition in my Chambers that 
the clerks have dinner with me one evening a week. We take that 
occasion to have some far-ranging discussions about the cases 
coming up at the next sitting as well as the progress of the 
opinions being drafted. It should be apparent that the decision-
making process is in a very advanced posture by the time I arrive 
at my New York City chambers for the sitting. By that stage, I 
have formed at least a tentative opinion in each case, subject to 
persuasion by oral argument or by discussion with my colleagues. 
The Second Circuit is the last federal court of appeals to 
maintain the tradition of oral argument in each case. 11.lthough 
all the other circuits pre-screen cases for oral argument, we 
continue the practice of allowing argument to all who request it, 
including pro se litigants. The judge presiding sets the time 
limits, which range from five to twenty minutes per side. II. 
recent exception was the II.gent Oranges cases. I was a member of 
the panel hearing those cases, and we had two days of argument, 
the longest since the Learned Hand Court heard the Jones & 
Laughlin Steel case. 
In spite of what some may think, oral argument continues to 
be a vital part of the decision-making process. Quite often, a 
judge will remark, following oral argument, that his perception 
of the case was turned completely around by the oral exchange. 
That being true, it is a source of increasing concern to me that 
the state of appellate advocacy in general, and appellate oral 
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advocacy in particular, is so poor. Dean Jonakait has been 
quoted as saying that advocacy courses should be part of the core 
curriculum. To that, I say "Amen." The best appellate advocacy 
today is in the law school moot court competitions. 
Final decision-making occurs in the robing room following 
oral argument in some of the cases. Tentative votes are recorded 
in other cases, and voting memos will be exchanged in the 
remainder. Voting memos are a long standing tradition in the 
Second Circuit and customarily are exchanged on the day of oral 
argument or on the following day. These memos provide a written 
record of a judge's vote as well as a brief summary of rationale. 
They are of great value to the judge ultimately assigned to write 
the opinion. Some appeals are determined to be of so little 
merit that summary orders of aff irmance are drawn and signed on 
the day of argument. 
The sitting week includes intense concentration on 
decision-making. The two clerks and one secretary who accompany 
me to New York are busy in drafting summary orders and assisting 
with bench memos and research. In addition, a number of 
substantive motions require the attention of the staff during the 
week. At week's end, the judges meet and review all the cases 
heard during the week, discuss the voting memoranda and describe 
any additional thoughts they may have had since the memoranda 
were exchanged. The votes are then taken and recorded, and 
opinions are assigned by the senior active judge, unless that 
judge is the dissenter. In the latter case, the next senior 
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active judge assigns. Thus ends the decision-making process. Or 
does it? It does not, because the circulation of opinions may 
lead to shifts in position as the judges reconsider the positions 
they have taken right up to the filing of the opinion. This will 
be illustrated in the actual case I intend to discuss later. 
Usually, there are between five and ten cases assigned to me 
for written opinions in various stages of completion in my 
chambers. Although I would prefer to do the first draft of each 
opinion, time constraints make that impossible, so I share first 
draft responsibilities with the Clerks. I do insist on doing my 
own first drafts in all concurring and dissenting opinions, all 
voting and other memoranda and in all other correspondence 
addressed to my colleagues. Sometimes, I seek comments from my 
Clerks on extracurricular articles and speeches I have written. 
All first drafts of opinions undergo extensive revisions at my 
hands. Finally, I conduct a conference, with all Clerks present, 
to review penultimate draft of the opinions. Fine tuning occurs 
at that time, and the opinion is ready for circulation to my 
colleagues on the panel. 
The decision-making process continues. Our tradition is to 
put aside all other work on receipt of a colleague's opinion in 
order to review and comment immediately. If a Judge is satisfied 
with a colleague's opinion, a small tab with the words "I concur" 
will be returned to the writer to attach to the original opinion 
when it is filed. Sometimes, the concurring tab is accompanied 
by a memo suggesting, but not requiring, certain changes in the 
0 
opinion. On occasion, a memo comes in unaccompanied by any tab. 
The memo might say: "I intend to concur if you change this 
paragraph or that sentence or this rationale. If you do not, I 
shall be constrained to concur or dissent, or something." It is 
at this point that I begin to think that I should have remained 
a trial judge. In any event, the decision-making process 
continues in an effort to accommodate the views of all panel 
members -- "hunting for the elusive tab," as I call it. Of 
course, the tab may come in with the words: "I concur in a 
separate opinion" or "I dissent in a separate opinion," 
accompanied by an appropriate concurrence or dissent. 
The decision-making process becomes very intense as the 
opinion circulates. The panel members may confer by telephone in 
an effort to reach consensus as perceptions of the case shift. 
The panel may be realigned as to rationale or as to the bottom 
line of the decision. When it all shakes out, the writer has in 
hand the finally revised opinion and possibly one or two 
concurrences or a dissent. If a dissent, the two judges in the 
majority will confer to decide whether any refutation of the 
dissent should be included in the majority opinion. The 
dissenter may wish to refute the refutations of the majority. 
Eventually, the opinion gets filed. But filing is not the end of 
the decision-making process. 
In a great number of cases, a petition for rehearing with a 
suggestion for a rehearing in bane is filed. The panel members 
thereby get another crack at the decision-making process. 
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Recently, a panel of which I was a member was constrained to 
grant such a petition because we had granted relief in favor of a 
non-appealing party. If there is a vote to deny rehearing, the 
petition then is circulated to the entire court along with the 
panel vote. Any judge may then call for a vote on a rehearing in 
bane. A majority vote of the active judges is needed to convene 
the court for such a rehearing. Although that is rare, we did 
sit in bane earlier this month to hear a case involving the Hobbs 
Act. After such a sitting, the decision-making process 
continues, with the exchange of voting memoranda and the 
assignment of the case to a judge who will have the great good 
fortune of pulling together the voting memoranda of a majority of 
the court in a way that will satisfy all. With the filing of the 
majority opinion and the concurrence and dissents, if any, of the 
in bane court, the decision-making process is conCluded -- until, 
of course, the case is remanded from the Supreme Court for 
further proceedings. 
Reflecting on the intellectual process of appellate 
decision-making in the Second Circuit after a year on the job, I 
am impressed by the narrow constraints by which we are bound. 
For example, we are required to accept the factual findings of 
the Trial Judge, unless they are clearly erroneous. I have long 
held the belief that in most cases, a statement of the facts 
dictates the legal conclusion. Although it sometimes seems 
apparent to me that the facts are different from those found by 
the Trial Judge, I cannot say that the findings are clearly 
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erroneous. So in a number of cases where it is apparent to me 
that the result should be different, there is nothing I can do 
about it. I recall the words of Professor Ivan Soubbotitch, who 
said: "In the practice of law, you will deal with feet much more 
than with law." Students should continue to be aware of that. 
Precedent and stare decisis also constrain the intellectual 
process of decision-making. If there is a precedent in the 
Second Circuit, it is not easily overruled by our Court. If a 
panel considers it necessary to depart from circuit precedent, 
the opinion is circulated to the entire court for comment. If 
there is precedent in another circuit, we must distinguish it, 
agree with it or give it careful reason why we disagree. ~lways, 
we must make sure that our decisions are consistent with Supreme 
Court doctrine. 
In the interpretation of statutes, the various rules of 
construction establish the parameters of decision-making. 
~lways, there is the temptation to apply judicial gloss and to 
fill in that which Congress has omitted, a temptation I am happy 
to avoid in the Frankfurter tradition. "Divining Congressional 
intent• is the term that is used, because the skills of a fortune 
teller are called for. In connection with the interpretation of 
a criminal statute, I recently asked my class why it was 
necessary for the Court to read into a statute something that 
Congress did not put there -- why the Judiciary was any better 
than the Congress to deal with the problem. ~ student answered: 





reason for judicial law-making. At any rate, my point is that, 
although the courts sometimes have gone afield in statutory 
interpretation, they are constrained by many rules of limitation. 
There are other limits upon the intellectual decision-making 
process in the form of rules we must abide by: that federalism 
counsels restraint when passing upon state action; that evidence 
in a criminal case is viewed on appeal in the light most 
favorable to the government; that generally, error cannot be 
assigned on appeal unless there are proper objections in the 
trial court; that matters cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. This is a work in progress and I am sure that there are 
many more limitations. My thesis simply is that appellate judges 
work within a very narrow compass indeed. 
Working within that compass, however, there is room for some 
flexibility and creativity in both the reviewing for correctness 
and law-making functions in the Courts of Appeals. This brings 
me to my illustration of a case that brings the whole process 
together. The case is Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, 
and the final decision is found in 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986). 
Dr. Hyland was a radiologist and a founder, officer and equal 
shareholder in the defendant professional corporation. The 
corporation was formed to conduct the practice of radiology and 
performed all such services for a local hospital. All the 
founding members contributed the same amount of capital, drew the 
same salaries and benefits, had equal voices in management and 
shared equally in profits and losses. They each executed 
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customary shareholders' agreements as well as agreements 
governing their employment by the corporation. 
Apparently, certain problems arose and the plaintiff was 
asked to resign his position. He entered into an agreement 
relating to the termination of employment and then sued in the 
United States District Court, claiming, among other things, that 
the corporation had discriminated against him because of age, in 
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 
The issue before us was whether the plaintiff was entitled 
to the benefits of the Act as an employee of the corporation or 
whether the district court was justified in holding that he 
should be considered a partner and therefore not entitled to the 
benefits. The district court held that the enterprise was 
managed and operated like a partnership and that the corporate 
entity was chosen merely to gain advantageous tax and civil 
liability treatment. 
My initial impression was to affirm, since I agreed that the 
so-called economic realities test should be applied. The test 
had been developed in a number of cases as a means of 
distinguishing employees from independent contractors or partners 
in other contexts, including anti-discrimination litigation. In 
the original exchange of voting memoranda, the Presiding Judge 
voted to affirm on the basis of the economic realities test; the 
other member of the panel voted to reverse on the application of 
a per se rule. In my voting memorandum, I agreed with the 




applied but voted to reverse on a finding that the plaintiff was 
an employee under that test on the facts of the case. 
We continued to discuss the case after returning to our home 
chambers and finally agreed that there should be no per se rule 
but that the plaintiff qualified as an employee. The Presiding 
Judge assigned himself to write the opinion. When the opinion 
came to me, I agreed with the ultimate conclusion but decided 
that I could not go along with the rationale and so indicated in 
a memorandum. The writing Judge weighed in with his memorandum 
to the effect that his proposed opinion was a compromise anyway, 
and that he would revert to his original position in favor of 
affirmance, essentially for the reasons given by the trial court. 
The other Judge wrote a memo that he too would revert to his 
original position, the position with which I had come to agree. 
Following a telephone conference, we decided that we could 
not arrive at a consensus in this case, and the original writer 
became the dissenter. The majority opinion was assigned to me by 
the third Judge, who had seniority. The result, a per se rule in 
the case of corporate employees who sue for ADEA violations, is 
now the law of the circuit. In writing the opinion, I was 
required to disagree with a Seventh Circuit case that held, 
without further analysis, that the role of a shareholder of a 
professional corporation is more analogous to a partner in a 
partnership than it is to the shareholder of a general 
corporation. I wrote, however, that "[i]t is one thing to apply 
an economic realities test to distinguish an employee from an 
independent contractor or partner, but it is quite another to 
apply the test in an attempt to identify as partner one 
associated with a corporate enterprise." The dissent applied the 
realities test and found the plaintiff to be a partner and 
therefore not an employee entitled to the benefits of the ADEA. 
In any event, the judgment of the district court was reversed and 
the matter "remanded for further proceedings consistent with the 
foregoing." 
I told you it was like sausage. 
